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Malwares control computer systems by infecting system files. They take advantage of system 
compatibilities to ensure their survival from one version to another. The structure of the windows 
portable executable (PE) files between available versions of the windows operating system (OS) makes 
these files an easy target for malwares. Fields and codes of clean PE files are modified and changed 
after infection. Checking both changes and modifications is necessary to detect malwares with a 
minimum false alarm rate. This paper reviews models that propose to detect PE malwares. It discusses 
PE structure and identifies the fields and locations that are vulnerable to malwares. It also explains the 
use of the human immune system and co-stimulation signals as a way to build a biological model for 
improving the ability of PE malware detection systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Malware is a generic term used to define different types 
of attack and threat codes that penetrate and infect 
computer systems (Bradfield, 2010). Most malwares act 
as an application inside a computer system (Jajodia, 
2009). Applications are targeted by anti-malware 
software to detect and prevent their activities. Detection 
and prevention are difficult because malwares change 
their behaviors and structures with every new generation 
(Szor, 1998). 
Periodically, technical reports from detection system 
vendors warn about new malwares, displaying charts and 
graphs to show how the number of malwares has 
increased over networks. A report from Symantec (2010) 
shows that the number of malwares has reached millions 
(Security, 2010). In addition, numerous zero-day malware 
infections are recorded and reported every day (Security, 
2010). A 2010 report from McAfee shows that up to 
55,000 new malwares are  reported  every  day  (McAfee,   
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2010). 
Current detection systems and anti-virus programs 
scan computer systems to look for malware instances 
that are already known (Clemens Kolbitsch, 2009). The 
non-dissection malware codes cannot be captured by 
available commercial detection systems. This means that 
the valid detection systems are able to recognize only the 
known patterns of malwares (Security, 2010). However, 
for unknown malwares, malware analysts should extract 
the behaviors and codes of malwares, after which they 
should update detection systems. Only then could such 
detection systems function properly (Zakaria, 2009). 
Although some anti-malware applications that depend 
on behavior detection techniques have the ability to 
predict the presence of some malwares, they still face 
two main challenges. First, available anti-virus programs 
are only able predict the presence of new malwares 
whose behaviors are closer to behaviors of known 
malwares (Jajodia, 2009; Security, 2010). This means 
that if there is a great difference between known and 
unknown behaviors, such a technique would likely fail to 
detect unknown malwares. With this inadequate ability to 
detect    new     malwares,    the     second     undesirable 
  
 
 
characteristic of the behavior-based detection system is 
the prevalence of false alarms, which only annoys users 
(Bradfield, 2010). 
This paper reviews the modifications and changes that 
malwares inflict on system files, as well as how they 
control the system’s execution and perform payloads and 
functionalities. This paper also tackles malware call 
functions of operating systems for execution and how 
these calls are traced to detect the execution behaviors of 
malwares. The work needs to include some explanations 
about biological co-stimulation and to study windows 
portable executable (PE) file structure to support 
proposing a biological model that could improve Malware 
detection and eliminate the False Alarm. 
 
 
Malwares and executable file Infectors 
 
Malicious code activities and functionalities infect 
computer systems every day. Various ways have been 
developed by virus writers to penetrate computer systems; 
however, prevention proves difficult. Moreover, current 
viruses have different types of payloads to perform 
different functionalities that challenge detection (Bradfield, 
2010). Many types of malicious codes perform different 
activities; however, this paper will focus on just three 
types: 
 
(a) Virus: A computer program that is usually hidden within 
another seemingly innocuous program, produces copies of 
itself and inserts them into other programs, and usually 
performs a malicious action (Zakaria, 2009). 
(b) Worm: A small, self-contained, and self-replicating 
computer program that invades computers on a network 
and usually performs a destructive action (Khaled et al., 
2010). 
(c) Trojan Horse: A seemingly useful computer program 
that contains concealed instructions which, when 
activated, performs an illicit or malicious action (Bradfield, 
2010). 
 
This paper has chosen these three types of malicious 
codes because they represent 85% of the total infection 
cases recorded in annual reports for 2009 to 2010 issued 
by antivirus software vendors (McAfee, 2010; Security, 
2010). In addition, the available antivirus programs still do 
not have the ability to recognize all types of malwares and 
detect zero-day malwares (Filiol et al., 2006; Sami et al., 
2010).  
The execution of such types of malwares is similar to the 
execution of any normal applications or programs that run 
under Windows OS. Malwares use many Windows 
functions stored in Kernel mode and user mode called 
Application Programming Interface (API) (Oney, 2002). To 
call these functions, malwares should have the physical 
addresses of the needed APIs, which cannot be obtained 
easily,  and  which  Windows  OS  will  not  simply  provide 
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(Willems et al., 2007). Thus, malwares find ways to collect 
these addresses from the Windows OS.  
Malwares are programmed to know that each normal 
application that runs under Windows OS has a predefined 
list of API names and addresses (Cheng, 2009). The listed 
API is imported by the application during execution or 
exported to other Windows applications (Oney, 2002). 
Malwares attack these PE applications to collect API 
addresses and control the execution of infected 
applications (Willems et al., 2007). They change certain 
fields and locations to direct the execution of the normal 
application PE to their codes, and then return the 
execution control to normal after performing their 
functionalities (Clemens, 2009). They also modify the list 
of needed API functions to include other functions required 
during code execution (Schmidt et al., 2009). 
The idea to insert codes in executable files originated in 
1986, when a programmer named Ralph Burger found that 
codes could be inserted into DOS executable file. He 
programmed a virus, called “Vir Dem,” with an executable 
infection capability. The virus has the ability to infect .com 
executable file under MS-DOS (Szor, 1998).  
When the Windows OS and Windows NT were released, 
most MS-DOS executable viruses failed to replicate under 
the new system. Only a few viruses were able to do so, 
such as Yankee Doodle, a very successful old Bulgarian 
virus (Merkel et al., 2010). Virus writers faced the new 
challenge of investigating the new operating system and 
creating new DOS executable viruses and boot viruses, 
with special attention to Windows 95 compatibility 
(Paquette, 2000). Since most virus writers did not have 
sufficient in-depth knowledge of the internal mechanisms 
of Windows 95, they looked for shortcuts to enable them 
to write viruses for the new platform (Shevchenko, 2007). 
They quickly found the first one—macro viruses, which are 
generally not dependent on the operating system or 
hardware differences (Skoudis and Zeltser, 2004). The 
first system-dependent virus, Boza, which was compatible 
with Windows 95, appeared on the same year that 
Windows 95 was launched. This virus was written by an 
Australian group called VLAD (Piccard, 2005)  
A new system-dependent virus called Cabanas virus 
was later written. Developed by Jaky/29A at the end of 
1997, the virus can infect Windows 95. Later, it was found 
to have the capability to infect other new Windows 
platforms, such as Windows 9X, Windows NT, and Win32. 
Soon the compatibility dream of the Windows platforms 
became a nightmare (Szor, 2006). The key role of 
Windows compatibility returned to the common file format 
or PE file format. This also makes it possible for viruses to 
jump from one 32-bit Windows platform to another easily, 
as Cabanas did (Chappell, 2006).  
In May 2000, the number of executable infectors 
reached more than 500. However, the most important 
Win32 development by virus writers was in Win32 worms 
(Higgins et al., 2003).Worms can replicate, propagate, and 
infect   without   a   user   interface  (Szor, 2006). The virus 
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writers moved from virus developers toward networked 
worm development. Moreover, techniques such as “code 
encryption” have made signature detection procedures 
more difficult (Paquette, 2000). In addition, most Win32 
infectors are unable to save the “entry point” of the PE 
files; therefore, curing the infected files became difficult, or 
even impossible (Ször, 2000). These activities prompted 
virus researchers to spend more efforts on PE infectors.  
The encryption techniques that hide signatures by 
encrypted PE viruses became more developed. Virus 
writers use polymorphic techniques to change the 
signature of a PE virus each time it infects a new file 
(Zakaria, 2009). The virus Win32.Driller, which was first 
reported in 2003, uses the Polymorphic techniques to hide 
its signature. The virus infects PE files that have .exe, .scr, 
and .cpl filename extensions. When run, the virus infects 
these files in current Windows and in Windows system 
directories (Tyagi and Vyas, 2008). The polymorphic 
technique gives the viruses the capability of changing their 
signature with each new infection (Xu et al., 2004). In 
2004, Symantec released a report showing that it received 
17,500 PE infector samples (Turner et al., 2004). 
Moreover, many strong malwares, such as Sassor and 
Win32 virus 1408, were released, and the types of system 
files that could be infected grew in number. Many data 
files of several antivirus programs were targeted and 
deleted by PE malwares (Fosnock, 2005). 
In 2005 to 2006, the number of PE infectors and 
malwares increased. Records show that the number of 
malwares in 2006 increased by 41% from 2005. Records 
further indicate that approximately 1,500 malwares are 
being recorded every month, including worms that are 
propagated through e-mail. In 2006, another malware, 
Virus.Win32.Saburex.a, was recorded, which has the 
capability to use a technique called Packer (Turner et al., 
2006). Packer is a software or a technique that is typically 
used to minimize the size of files or data that are 
transferred over networks or through e-mails (Wei and 
Ansari, 2008). Unfortunately, virus developers misused 
this technique to hide malicious codes inside PE files. The 
problem with this technique is that malicious codes cannot 
be scanned until the file is executed and the image of the 
PE is saved to the memory. In addition, scanners cannot 
mark any packed files as malwares because packers are 
initiated as normal software for files and data compression 
purposes (Wei and Ansari, 2008). 
Increasing the complexity of PE malwares was come in 
parallel with their steady increase in number. 
Approximately 45,690 new malwares were recorded in 
November 2008 and 46,014 in January 2009 (Coorp, 
2008). Antivirus and detection system programs should be 
aware of all these techniques and have adequate 
information about the behaviors of malwares to properly 
detect them. Complex malwares have many behaviors 
that   are   similar  to   those  of  clean  files. This  leads  to 
 
 
 
 
increase the false alarm rate. Figure 1 shows the status of 
false alarm rate of (2010) version for antivirus detection 
softwares (AV-Comparative, 2010). 
Files should be thoroughly checked to distinguish a 
clean file from an infected one with zero error rates. This 
work expected such improvement by inserting a double 
checking process in the detection systems, as Immune 
System does.  
 
 
Malware detection models 
 
Most reviewers and researchers agree that the significant 
problems in current malware detection models have to do 
with the accuracy of prediction and the ability to detect 
unknown malwares (Bradfield, 2010). There are many 
considerations for improving the ability of antivirus 
systems. Current signature-based antivirus programs still 
cannot detect unknown malwares, whereas behavior-
based detection systems are accompanied by the 
annoying false alarm (Jajodia, 2009; Security, 2010).  
Therefore, the time has come to go deeper into the 
infected file, and to open and see, as the surgeons say, 
what an external scan cannot identify (Cheng, 2009). Most 
infected files are the executable and system files; 
therefore, researchers aim to study the structure of these 
PE files, determine the models that can compute the 
differences between a clean and an infected case, and 
refine malware detection (Khaled et al., 2010).  
Using classical file scanning, the researchers find 
difficulty in dealing with the sophisticated techniques used 
by malwares, such as polymorphic and metamorphic 
techniques (Xu et al., 2004; Mori, 2004). Xu et al. (2004) 
introduced a model that traced and analyzed API 
sequence for applications, using the API sequences as 
signatures to detect new strains of known polymorphic 
viruses. Xu et al. (2004) relied on a hypothesis that 
polymorphic viruses can change their signature; however, 
the sequence of their API did not change. The model can 
detect instances of known polymorphic viruses and can 
search for similarities to detect unknown strains. However, 
there are some malwares using the metamorphic 
techniques that have the ability to reorder the sequence of 
API calls (Mori, 2004). During the evaluation, optimization 
is needed to improve new sequence generation. Including 
more than one feature, rather than considering just the 
API behavior calculation feature, is necessary. With more 
than one feature, the analysis result of the second feature 
will support or correct the first one.  
The same API sequence topic was proposed by Miao 
Wang (2009) to build an abnormal intrusion detection 
system. They saw that the domain used by Xu et al. 
(2004) does not cover all types of APIs in case new 
malwares are applied to the detection system. They 
trained  their  proposed  model  to   detect   abnormal   API
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Figure 1. False alarm rate for available detection systems. 
 
 
 
sequences using both native and user mode API 
functions, and found that monitoring the user API calls is 
not sufficient to trace new malwares. This is because 
many malwares can call API directly. Malwares can 
expand their domain to include all API functions available 
in the computer system in the training vectors, while the 
window size of trained vectors remain the same six 
elements used by Xu et al. (2004). This enables new 
APIs within each vector to be seen as malwares that 
somehow become included in the training set of normal 
vectors. Distinguishing such vectors from normal vectors 
is difficult and likely leads to a high false alarm rate 
because there are many shared APIs between normal 
vectors and abnormal vectors in the training set. 
The API functions required by a PE file execution are 
saved in the import table field (Essam, 2008). Malwares 
simply make a few changes in the API calls inside the 
“import table” of the PE by inserting the new API 
functions needed to execute its payload (Szor, 2006). 
The percentage or degree of changes in the API list in 
import table shows if the file is infected or is still in the 
correct status. This concept was used by Karmer and 
Bradfield (2009) and (Bradfield, 2010) as a hypothesis to 
describe malwares. The hypothesis states that any 
changes in the correct software affect the correctness 
measurement (that is, degree of changes); therefore, 
malwares may be determined according to the degree of 
correctness.   The   process    involves    measuring    the 
normality of a program that a malware requires to defeat 
scanning programs. Such models are very sensitive to 
any changes and have a high false alarm rate (Szor, 
2006). They need verification to control and minimize this 
rate, and further investigate the suspected PE files.  
The PE file anatomy is not a new topic; in fact, it has 
been used by many detection models to check for the 
presence of malware codes or analyze malware behavior 
(Father, 2004; Mori, 2004; Jajodia, 2009). (Khaled et al., 
2010) built an AMI model based on clonal selection 
algorithm. They used the API call sequence to classify 
malwares, using compression between some algorithms, 
with acceptable results. They concluded that the false 
alarm still exists.   
Many techniques are applied to the API call sequence 
to detect or classify malwares accurately. Sam et al. 
(2010) used data mining techniques to analyze the API 
call sequences. Although, they claimed that these 
techniques minimize the false alarm, minimization could 
be further improved and eliminated if they involved 
changes behavior of malwares as features for 
verification.     
The verification method used by (Cheng, 2009) applied 
probability rules such as conditional probability. They 
classified the contents of PE fields into normal and 
abnormal behavior groups, and used the same API 
domain to identify the normal and abnormal probability 
values.  They  also   used  both  values  to  calculate   the  
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conditional probability on normality, and finally compare 
the result with a predefined threshold. However, no 
verification of normality or abnormality results is available 
before applying the conditional probability. In addition, the 
verification is built into the same domain. This is similar to 
analyzing two half stories from the viewpoint of one type of 
data. Building a verification process inside the malware 
detection system is necessary. The principle of verification 
is required to make a case meaningful or clear, which can 
be achieved in different ways.  
Towards this end, determining what malwares do inside 
a PE file would be desirable, and discovering how 
modifications of the API sequence or API list in import 
table can confirm this information. Malwares make 
changes in several locations inside the PE files to obtain 
control of the program execution (Szor, 1998; Szor, 2006). 
The system should record the changes to these entry 
point locations made inside the PE files by malwares. 
These changes could be considered as a starting point to 
build a malware detection system (Mori, 2004). 
(Nachenberg, 2001) explained that most possible 
locations that a malware infects are changed. His model 
scanned these locations and sent the results to an 
emulation process to detect malwares. This action could 
support the verification of what an API sequence scanner 
will decide. 
 
 
Biological models to detect malwares 
 
In previous years, many biological models have been 
proposed to improve computer security systems. Most of 
them try to mimic the human immune system because of 
its strong capacity to defend against viruses and bacteria. 
Specifically, the immune system has the capability to 
discriminate between self- and non-self cells, and to 
update itself to launch unknown foreign cells inside the 
human body (Julie et al., 2010).  
Forrest et al. (2002) proposed the self- and non-self 
discrimination process. In his research, Forrest showed 
how problems of computer security could be solved by 
making the computer system recognize the normal files 
and distinguish them from the abnormal ones. Other 
researchers have used mathematical approaches to prove 
his hypothesis. Theoretically, they obtained good results; 
however, no explanations or details have been provided 
regarding how this proposal could be validated. When an 
infected file that looks like a normal one is executed, for a 
few seconds or less than a second, it becomes harmful as 
it achieves its functionalities.     
The normal file is considered as abnormal after insertion 
of malicious codes into normal one by a malware 
(Bradfield, 2010). The detection systems and antivirus 
programs should recognize the binary representation of 
these malicious codes or their execution behaviors. 
D'haeseleert et al. (2002) proposed the negative selection 
algorithm to build detectors that  can  recognize  unwanted  
 
 
 
 
patterns. To build these detectors, they focused on 
information taken from the self set without referencing any 
information about the non-self set. This has led to an 
increase in the computational cost of this algorithm 
because the number of detectors is exponentially related 
to the size of the self set. Even if the relation improved 
linearly, as shown by Stibor et al. (2005), the number of 
required detectors remains too large; in addition, these are 
not guided detectors.   
Most immune system-based models that work using 
pattern recognition utilize either clonal selection algorithm, 
negative selection algorithm, or the danger method 
(Srinivasan, 2009; Jieqiong et al., 2010) to build detectors. 
However, the discrimination process in the immune 
system is completed and confirmed only when the co-
stimulation signal is found. A survey conducted by Bo-yun 
(2006) classified the applications that could be achieved 
by the artificial immune system. The survey included 
models that propose to build different security and 
detection systems. The algorithms used by detection 
models are built upon the processes that were already 
used to generate perfect detectors. These models 
presuppose the cases to be already abnormal and then 
simply attempt to create suitable detectors for the 
abnormality. The authors of all the proposed work agree 
that the key task of any AMI is discrimination; however, 
they built their models on algorithms that occurs during the 
proliferation stage, which comes after a confirmation 
signal from the co-stimulation process has confirmed the 
discrimination between self and non-self (Smith, 2006). 
Without the verification and confirmation process, the 
negative selection algorithm generates a false alarm. In 
their investigation, Kim and Bentley (2001) used NSA in 
the anomaly detection system. They found that this 
algorithm can work similarly to a filter for anomaly cases 
and cannot generate competent detectors. The result they 
obtained implicitly shows that models that mimic NSA are 
expected to have a high false alarm rate; thus, they 
proposed to extend the NSA model.  
Other researchers, such as Stibor et al. (2005), 
proposed that the detection set in NSA should contain 
negative and positive elements in order to work properly. 
They suggested applying two classes to the support vector 
machine (SVM) to build an anomaly detection model. The 
suggestion did not mention any characteristics of the 
features of elements in each class, thereby affecting the 
accuracy of the model. The self and non-self discrimi-
nation by NSA was reviewed in detail by Aickelin et al. 
(2004). They explained many suggestions made by other 
researchers and showed the ability of AIS in the field of 
“intrusion detection system”. They encouraged doing 
further research in this area, applying a wider data set and 
samples in training and testing stages to minimize the 
false rate obtained during discrimination. 
Apparently, the filtration of self from non-self performed 
by NSA needs optimization to improve the accuracy of the 
detection procedures. Researchers have worked to mutate  
  
 
 
 
 
 
elements to predict new patterns. Towards this end, the 
clonal selection algorithm proposed by many researchers 
has been widely used as an extension and an 
improvement to the NSA. The algorithm has been 
described by Yu and Hou (2004) as a practical and 
simple tool for simulation and experiments. The steps of 
this algorithm, described biologically by Edge et al. 
(2006) as the self-organization, adaption, diversification 
and then positive selection and negative selection of an 
element, relate to self and non-self. The algorithm was 
investigated by De Castro and Timmis (2002), who 
showed how active detectors could be used to activate 
other detectors and maintain the ability of detection 
systems. The clonal selection algorithm reduces the time 
spent on detection. The algorithm achieves mutation to 
increase the affinity degree of matching, and allows the 
pattern recognition to be faster when the next infection 
occurs (Dasgupta, 2007). In addition, the mutation of the 
clonal selection algorithm helps the prediction of new 
patterns and new computer viruses within the range of 
the training domain. Biologically, this stage depends on 
the co-stimulation signal that has already identified a 
foreign cell as a non-self (Khaled et al., 2010). 
Another survey done by Hart and Timmis (2008) on 
applications was inspired by the artificial immune system 
where anomaly detection and computer virus is one of 
the minor applications. They stated that problems in all 
research studies come from the information used to 
represent training sets, such as depending on one source 
in building set and how many elements should be 
inserted. The studies attempted to solve the issue of 
fitting the detectors with some anomaly or virus cases. 
This implies that unknown cases are already considered 
as viruses or anomaly cases. All these issues are defined 
from the viewpoint of negative selection and clonal 
selection. However, Aickelin and Cayzer (2002) noted 
that negative selection algorithm has a false alarm rate, 
and clonal selection algorithm has many shared areas 
with self and non-self sets. He tried to propose the 
Danger Theory to overcome the problems of previous 
algorithms. Matzinger’s Danger Theory debates the self 
and non-self point of view (Kim et al., 2005). The theory 
agrees that the discrimination of self and non-self should 
occur, then negative selection and clonal selection 
algorithms can be achieved correctly. However, all 
programmers who used Danger Theory agree that this 
theory can work correctly only if the data set is limited 
(Glaser and Strauss, 2007).  
As summarized in Table 1, the subject of using a 
biological model to promote security and analyze 
malwares is not new. However, there is a biological 
phenomenon in “human immune system” activities, called 
co-stimulation, which has not inspired work in security 
issues.  This phenomenon is responsible for improving 
the accuracy of discrimination between self and  non-self. 
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This activity is responsible for not attacking self cells as 
non-self cells. 
 
 
Immunity System Co-stimulation (ISC): Biological 
verification 
 
The human body’s immune system is an excellent 
defense system. It performs complex activities to keep 
the body clean from antigens, and adapts itself to detect 
and memorize unknown antigens (Health, 2003). Its key 
role is to distinguish between the normal (self) cells and 
abnormal (non-self) cells. The distinguishing process is 
achieved through cooperation between immune cells with 
the presence of some enzymes that work as 
communication signals between those cells (Hofmery, 
2000). These signals control the activities of the immune 
system.  They direct the defense process correctly and, 
in perfect situations, they instruct the immune cells in 
performing their functions, such as the proliferation 
process, when a specific antibody has been generated 
and memorized for an antigen (Naik, 2003).These signals 
are controlling the activities of the immune system.  They 
are directing the defense process correctly and only in 
perfect situations they instruct immune cells to do their 
functions, such as the proliferation process, when a 
specific antibody has generated and memorized for an 
antigen (Naik, 2003).  
As a first response, B-cells will engulf a suspected body 
and analyze it. Pieces of engulfed body as activate the 
major histocompatibility complex (MHC) in peptides on 
the surface of B-cell. The MHC rising in the B-cell signals 
to two types of T helper cells (that is, Th- CD+4 and Th- 
CD+8) to be stimulated the MHC (Michael, 1997; Naik, 
2003).  
When receptors of Th- CD+4 are activated with MHC, 
the first signal (Signal 1) detecting an abnormal case is 
satisfied. The degree of activation differs as not all 
receptors have the same shape as MHC. The degree of 
such activation represents the affinity. The Th-cell will 
bind with the MHC protein in another form using (CD+8) 
to confirm (Signal 1). The incorrect activation of (CD+8) 
Th-cell will not generate the confirmation signal (Signal 
2). This means that Signal 1 is generated incorrectly and 
the engulfed B-cell will be marked as anergic cells 
(Health, 2003). However, correct activation will result in 
the co-stimulation signal. In this situation, the immune 
system will decide to build an arsenal of a certain type of 
antibody and killer cell through the proliferation of B and 
T cell to kill the antigens, thereby cleaning the body, and 
to memorize the built antibodies (Michael, 1997). Figure 2 
illustrates the co-stimulation and its effects (Naik, 2003).  
Co-stimulation signals, sometimes called two-signal 
messages, come from simultaneous activation of two 
different  Th- cell types with an antigen (Naik, 2003). This  
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Table 1. Summary of malware detection system’s works. 
 
References / Researchers Method used Contribution Analysis 
(Forrest et al., 2002) 
First one used mathematical approach 
to design biological model for detection 
system. They depend on negative 
selection algorithm. 
They proved that 
malwares could be 
detected even they are 
unknown. 
Their work needs to be validated. 
    
(D'haeseleer, 2002) They used negative selection algorithm to build a biological model.  
They proved NSA 
statistically. They 
proved that malwares 
can be detected as 
they will not be within 
the normal domain. 
They just depended on the self set 
information. This leads to increase 
computational cost. 
    
(J-Y. Xu et al., 2004) 
Tracing suspected file’s  API sequence 
and using similarity measurement 
between two sequences. 
Their model could find 
new strains of 
polymorphic infections. 
They assume that the sequence of the 
API polymorphic malwares will not 
change, although the signature 
changed. However, there are some 
malwares, such as metamorphic one, 
will change this sequence. 
    
(Bo-yun Zhang, 2006) 
They used support vector machine to 
build a method to detect computer 
viruses. 
They can minimize the 
dataset size with 
keeping detection of 
virus on good rate.  
However, it takes more time to scan 
strings and hence more cost 
computational.  
The survey not included the co-
stimulation process for discrimination. 
    
(Stibor et al., 2005) They applied two sets to the support 
vector machine. 
They making the 
relation between the 
detectors and set size 
became linearly. 
The detectors were not guided 
detectors.  
    
(Hart and Timmis, 2008) Did Survey on artificial immune system 
models 
Reviewed many 
applications. 
No touch found to co-stimulation 
process. 
    
(Cheng, 2009) They applied Byase algorithm on API 
sequence to detect malicious codes. 
The work able to detect 
malwares based on 
known behaviors. 
Conditional probability for a case 
obtained and compared to a threshold 
to decide if a case is malware or not. 
Some errors will records due to the 
threshold value. 
    
(Miao Wang, 2009) Tracing API using  support vector 
machine  
They included the 
native APIs in training 
set to find abnormality 
of a suspected file. 
The wider area of API will lead to 
increase the false alarm of the model. 
(Bradfield, 2010) The used Formal method to define Malwares and to find their anti. 
Tried to detect 
malwares based on the 
degree of correctness 
of a suspected file. 
The method needs validation. It has 
been checked only on the malwares that 
already known. However, the 
correctness of unknown Malwares could 
not be measured.  
    
(Khaled et al., 2010) They used clonal selection algorithm in the work as malware classifier. 
Their work can classify 
unknown malwares. 
However, they already predefined some 
group of malwares and accordingly a 
malwares lays in one. Problems will be 
with malwares that have different group 
characteristics. 
    
This work 
Will use artificial Intelligence (ANN) or 
(Fuzzy logic) as a machine learning to 
implement immune system co-
stimulation 
Munising false alarm 
and error rate. 
Biological model will mimic co-
stimulation process to do confirmation 
so that false rate could be eliminated. 
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Figure 2. Process of co-stimulation and proliferation. 
 
 
 
is a basic and essential condition for considering an 
antigen as a non-self cell. Without this message, the 
popular stage, which is the proliferation of antibodies, will 
not be activated. Even if activated, theoretically, this will 
generate improper antibodies that may possibly attack self 
cells. The process of self-attack means activating a self 
cell as an antigen (Julie et al., 2010). Such a case is 
similar to the process of generating a false alarm when a 
normal file is identified as a malware by a computer 
detection system (Nachenberg, 2001). 
 
 
(PE) structure and infected locations 
 
The suspected file in this work is a Windows PE file. The 
structure and the format of these files, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, play a key role in achieving the compatibility of 
Windows OS with its versions (Pietrek, 1994). They use 
the same format in linking, loading, and memory imaging 
of a program file executed under this environment. This 
also explains why virus writers spend more time in 
learning the PE file structure (Father, 2004).  
Malware writers and detection builders should have 
sufficient knowledge about the structure of PE files. 
Malware writers use these files to hide their infection 
codes and payloads. Therefore, the detection system 
builders should know the locations of possible malware 
infections to modify them (Miao Wang, 2009).  
Before identifying the locations and fields that malwares 
have probably infected, explaining the functionalities of 
important locations in the PE structure is more desirable. 
The PE structure consists of headers and sections that 
explain the logical and physical information of file storage 
and execution. The physical part is called ‘file header”, 
which contains such information as number of sections 
and size of optional header. The logical part, known as 
“optional header’, has information such as “relevant virtual 
address, file or section alignments, address of entry 
points”, and many others (Wei and Ansari, 2008). 
The third header, “section header”, is also called 
“section table”. It is a structure that contains information 
concerning the PE sections that follow this header. It is 
one of the important layers that scans for malware 
detection because each PE file is described in specific 
directory in the section header (Szor, 1998). 
In general, sections are used to store data and codes 
of the file separately. Windows applications have nine 
predefined sections: .text, .bss, .rdata, .idata, .rsrc, .edata, 
.pdata, reloc, and .debug. Some applications may not 
need all of these sections, whereas others may require still 
more sections to suit their specific needs (Miao Wang, 
2009). 
Codes and instructions of the PE file are stored in the 
.text section, whereas data of the PE file are stored in 
.bss, .rdata, or .data, sections based on their types (Ye et 
al., 2008).  
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Figure 3. A typical structure of a (PE) file. 
 
 
 
Table 2. PE locations need checking. 
 
References Locations scanned Purpose of scan 
(Cheng, 2009) e-ifanew As indicating the address where PE execution started. 
   
(Khaled et al., 2010) Number of sections Malwares modify this section because mostly they add new 
section/s to the file. 
   
(Cheng, 2009) Address of entry point Malware uses this address to point to its code address. 
   
(Essam,  2008) Size of image It is indicating the memory size needed to execute the PE file. Malware will change this location. 
   
(Essam,  2008) Check sum Sometime, malware modify it to indicate their presence. 
   
(Jajodia, 2009) Section table – size  of section code (.text) 
The .text section is containing codes and additional jump table for 
all Dll calls. Malware will insert their code in this field. The size of 
code increased and means changing it also in section table. 
 
 
 
The most important sections that malwares always scan 
are .edata and .idata. These sections contain information 
about the physical addresses of the Windows functions, 
which are called application programmable interface (API). 
The .edata section contains information about APIs that 
the file exports, whereas .idata features information about 
APIs that the file imports. The “import table” in the .idata is 
used by malware analysts to identify whether or not a PE 
file is infected (Ye et al., 2008).  
To build an active and efficient detection system, this 
paper identifies the important locations that have likely 
been changed by malwares. Table 2 discusses these 
fields and locations. This paper also explains why these 
locations   are   important   and   what   changes   malware  
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Figure 4. The (AISC) framework. 
 
 
 
perform during infection.  
One or more of the above locations and fields should be 
changed by malwares so that they can control the 
execution of PE files and execute their payloads 
(Clemens, 2009).  
 
 
The framework of the proposed model. 
 
Based on my best knowledge, the pervious AMI works 
have just depended on three types of immune system 
algorithms; negative selection algorithm, clonal selection 
algorithm and danger theory. However, the biological 
defense system will not activate these algorithms until the 
co-stimulation signals will confirm the discrimination 
process. The co-stimulation process will eliminate self 
attacking cases in the body. Self attacking process is 
attacking self cells and considered them as viruses. This 
is, somehow, like the false alarm in computer security 
systems when normal file detected as  abnormal  and  vice  
versa.   
Therefore, the inspiration of co-stimulation process in 
biological based detection systems could improve the 
accuracy of such systems.  
To do that, this work proposed a model that checked 
fields inside the PE files that probably malware will change 
them during infection. Meanwhile, the execution behavior 
of the same file will be checked too. Both results will be 
compared so that the first result will confirm the second. 
As illustrated in the Figure 4, the framework that 
suggested by this work is consist of three stages. The 
stages are “co-stimulation unit, scanned suspected file 
and prediction stage”. The part related to this work is co-
stimulation unit. It performs two tasks: 
 
Controlling: In the scanning section there are two nodes 
that scanned the suspected file, each in different direction; 
execution behavior and modification behavior. The control 
part of co-stimulation unit will instruct these two nodes to 
start scanning the identify locations in the PE file to extract  
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information. The information passed to stage three for 
analyzing. 
 
Verification: Stage three will generate two results. These 
results will send as feedback to verification part of the co-
stimulation unit. Depending on these results the output of 
the co-stimulation unit will generate and discrimination of 
the suspected file could confirm. 
 
The analyzer stage will use a Feed forward back 
propagation neural network. The number of nodes at input 
layer depended on the number of features that extracted 
from PE file. Features will cover the modifications made 
on some locations by malwares and changes in execution 
behaviors of the infected file. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The theory that this work has just presented takes its 
inspiration from the co-stimulation process of human 
immune system. This process takes a strong and an 
important role to build a right decision about the normality 
or abnormality for a case by the immune defense system 
of human. It will identify the type of responses that 
immune system should take against unknown case and 
controls the respond system to not attack normal cases.  
The work contributed in this review could improve the 
following issues in detection systems. 
The model could improve the accuracy of detection 
systems, because it will check the suspected files with two 
different groups of API. 
 
a. Improving the false alarm rate for detection systems. 
b.Improving the prediction rate for unknown malwares, as 
the system will not depend on a threshold value or other 
probability application. 
c. Minimizing the cost of computation for detection 
systems. 
d. Building direct detectors that not need optimization. 
 
There is no doubt that the above improvements will make 
detection systems to perform their functionalities better.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many biological models proposed to bring solutions to 
computer detection systems. They are touched many 
algorithms such negative selection, clonal selection and 
danger theory. All algorithms used to build detectors and 
to maturate them in order to activate with a suspected 
case perfectly. 
Most works followed with error rate in detection as they 
checked the suspected cases only with one dataset and 
sometimes with two small size dataset. Even with using 
two    datasets,   there   is   no   verification  process  used  
 
 
 
 
between them to confirm their results. 
This review work has found that there is a missed link in 
all proposed works to improve the detection process by 
decreasing the false alarm rate, which is building a 
confirmation system between these two datasets that 
extracted from the suspected case.  
This work will inspired the co-stimulation process in our 
proposed model to perform the confirmation process, 
which expected to increase the accuracy of the detection 
processes as it does in human immune system. 
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